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I. INTRODUCTION 
Criminal records stigmatize1 convicted persons,2 which encourages society 
to treat them as less than human—as “other.”3 Once “otherized,” “criminals” 
are often denied the opportunity to live their best lives and reach their full 
potential.4 Indeed, a criminal record can limit one’s ability to work,5 obtain an 
 
 1 See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 
1 (Simon & Schuster, Inc. 1986) (1963) (defining “stigma” as “signs designed to expose 
something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier”). 
 2 Murat C. Mungan, Gateway Crimes, 68 ALA. L. REV. 671, 672 (2017) (“Broadening 
the reach of criminal law means stigmatizing more people by branding them as criminals.”); 
Jemima Galan, Note, Banning the Box, Building a Future; How Expansion of California’s 
Legislation Would Mend the Threaded Strands Between Recidivism and Employment in 
Criminally Convicted Offenders, 37 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 343, 351 (2016) (“Criminally 
convicted persons are often subjected to stereotyping, and are ostracized given the stigma 
associated with a criminal conviction.”); see Juan Alberto Arteaga, Note, Juvenile 
(In)Justice: Congressional Attempts to Abrogate the Procedural Rights of Juvenile 
Defendants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2002) (asserting that “the stigma of a 
permanent criminal record impede[s] [juveniles’] ability to become productive, law abiding 
citizens”). 
 3 Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 259, 265 (2011) (discussing how “people judged as criminals come to be regarded 
as less than human”); Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal, & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study 
of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1184 (2004) (“For the criminal, outside contact 
becomes problematic because of the risk that normal people will disapprove or define a 
criminal only in terms of his stigma. Outsiders, for their part, will avoid a criminal because 
of the possibility that being seen with one will contaminate them both socially and legally.”) 
(citation omitted); Nora V. Demleitner, Is There a Future for Leniency in the U.S. Criminal 
Justice System?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1255 (2005) (book review) (hypothesizing that 
“TV shows such as ‘Cops’ have contributed to the view of criminal offenders as less than 
human, as deserving of any degradation that would befall them”); Joseph C. Dugan, Note, I 
Did My Time: The Transformation of Indiana’s Expungement Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1321, 1323 
(2015) (describing Goffman’s theory that most members of society view “stigmatized 
persons” as “not quite human”). 
 4 Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten 
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1705 (2003) [hereinafter 
Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate] (“The collateral consequences of a criminal 
conviction linger long after the sentence imposed by the court has been served, depriving ex-
offenders of the tools necessary to reestablish themselves as law-abiding and productive 
members of the free community.”); Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need 
for Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (discussing the 
obstacles that a person faces as a result of a criminal record). See generally Simone Ispa-
Landa & Charles E. Loeffler, Indefinite Punishment and the Criminal Record: Stigma 
Reports Among Expungement-Seekers in Illinois, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 387 (2016) (discussing 
findings of interviews of people seeking expungement of their criminal records); James L. 
Wagner, Comment, Expungement in Ohio: Assimilation into Society for the Former 
Criminal, 8 AKRON L. REV. 480 (1975) (explaining the role of expungement in alleviating 
the consequences that result from arrest and conviction). 
 5 This results from state laws that forbid people from working in certain occupations 
or obtaining professional licenses, see Occupational Licensing: Vague “Moral Character” 
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education,6 find housing,7 or receive public benefits.8 As former Chief Justice 
Earl Warren explained, “Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person 
which . . . seriously affects his reputation and economic opportunities.”9 But the 
consequences do not end there. A criminal record can also impact one’s mental 
 
Requirements Leave Workers with Records on Uncertain Ground, NAT’L INVENTORY 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION (Apr. 22, 2019), https://niccc.csgjustice 
center.org/2019/04/22/occupational-licensing-vague-moral-character-requirements-leave-
workers-with-records-on-uncertain-ground/ [https://perma.cc/HJY8-PR4Z], as well as 
employer preferences, see Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael, & Michael A. Stoll, The Effect 
of an Applicant’s Criminal History on Employer Hiring Decisions and Screening Practices: 
Evidence from Los Angeles, in BARRIERS TO REENTRY?: THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED 
PRISONERS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 117, 118, 123–25 (Shawn Bushway, Michael A. 
Stoll, & David F. Weiman eds., 2007); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 
AM. J. SOC. 937, 960 (2003) (concluding that people with criminal records are one-half to 
one-third as likely as those without records to be considered by employers). 
 6 See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2012) (detailing ineligibility for student loans as a result of 
being convicted of certain drug crimes while receiving student loans); Margaret Colgate 
Love, Managing Collateral Consequences in the Sentencing Process: The Revised 
Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal Code, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 249 (“Collateral 
consequences now reach into every corner of modern life, making it hard to . . . get an 
education . . . .”); Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 
2005 n.212 (2016) (mentioning restrictions on education as a collateral consequence of a 
criminal conviction). 
 7 See Ann Cammett, Confronting Race and Collateral Consequences in Public 
Housing, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1123, 1138–41 (2016) (discussing federal statutes allowing 
public housing tenants and applicants to be evicted or denied housing based on criminal 
records, particularly for drug offenses); Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on 
Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1218 (2010) 
(noting that a criminal record can restrict public housing).  
 8 Paul T. Crane, Incorporating Collateral Consequences into Criminal Procedure, 54 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 16 (2019) (noting that “[c]riminal convictions can preclude a 
defendant from accessing a wide range of public benefits”). 
 9 Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593–94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), overruled in 
part by Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). 
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health and overall sense of well-being,10 and these burdens are often shouldered 
by families as well.11 
Expungement and record sealing provide a measure of relief for those 
seeking to escape the stigma.12 Expungement, in its literal sense, means the 
permanent destruction of the official conviction record,13 while record sealing 
“is a process where a criminal record is sequestered and prevented from being 
accessed by the public.”14 Although expungement and record sealing are distinct 
concepts, many jurisdictions use the term “expungement” to describe their 
record-sealing provisions.15 
Currently, thirty-nine U.S jurisdictions provide some form of expungement 
or record sealing (“criminal record relief”), with another four states allowing 
certain convictions to be set aside but not sealed.16 Most of these jurisdictions 
limit criminal record relief to lower-level, non-violent offenses, or to “first 
 
 10 April D. Fernandes, How Far Up the River? Criminal Justice Contact and Health 
Outcomes, 7 SOC. CURRENTS 29, 40 (2020) (“The findings for mental health suggest an even 
more pervasive and pernicious impact. From an arrest to a conviction to a jail sentence, 
results show an impact on self-reported mental health across all points of contact. These 
findings suggest that there may be multiple mechanisms at play, with time engaged with the 
criminal justice system operating in conjunction with the stress and strain of the 
proceedings.”); Ispa-Landa & Loeffler, supra note 4, at 403–05 (discussing emotional and 
cognitive responses to being stigmatized by a criminal record); Kelley E. Moore, Jeffrey B. 
Stuewig, & June P. Tangney, The Effect of Stigma on Criminal Offenders’ Functioning: A 
Longitudinal Mediational Model, 37 DEVIANT BEHAV. 196, 197 (2016) (citing Patrick W. 
Corrigan, Amy C. Watson, & Leah Barr, The Self-Stigma of Mental Illness: Implications for 
Self-Esteem and Self Efficacy, 25 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 875, 881–82 (2006)) (“The 
belief that one’s group is devalued by the public is thought to negatively affect self-esteem 
and self-efficacy, which ultimately affect expectations about future interactions, coping, 
mental health, and behavior.”). 
 11 Mouzon, supra note 4, at 7; JEREMY TRAVIS, ELIZABETH CINCOTTA MCBRIDE, & 
AMY L. SOLOMON, URBAN INST. FAMILIES LEFT BEHIND: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF 
INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 7–8 (June 2005) (observing that because of “[b]arriers to 
finding employment and housing,” ex-prisoners with children in foster care may have 
difficulty obtaining the housing and employment necessary to reunify with their children), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305487992_Families_Left_Behind_The_Hidden
_Costs_of_Incarceration_and_Reentry (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). 
 12 See Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate, supra note 4, at 1723–25 (describing 
expungement and record sealing provisions). 
 13 Chris Skall, Journey out of Neverland: CORI Reform, Commonwealth v. Peter Pon, 
and Massachusetts’s Emergence as a National Exemplar for Criminal Record Sealing, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 337, 341 (2016) (“Expungement is the process of destroying, erasing, or 
holistically preventing access to a criminal record such that neither the public nor 
governmental actors can access it.”). 
 14 Id. at 341–42. 
 15 Mouzon  ̧supra note 4, at 5 n.15; Skall, supra note 13, at 342. 
 16 50-State Comparison: Expungement, Sealing & Other Record Relief, RESTORATION 
RTS. PROJECT (July 2020), https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-
comparisonjudicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside/ [https://perma.cc/9C8S-3AWS] 
[hereinafter 50-State Comparison]. 
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offenders.”17 The remaining jurisdictions—eight states and the federal 
government—provide no general criminal record relief.18  
Scholars have already engaged in a robust debate about the practical 
benefits and shortcomings of criminal record relief.19 This Article contributes 
to this conversation by highlighting an oft-overlooked value of granting criminal 
record relief: the humanization of those who have rehabilitated themselves. This 
benefit alone makes such relief worthwhile even if truly keeping one’s criminal 
record secret is impossible in the Information Age.20 Accordingly, this Article 
contends that criminal record relief should be broadly available and not limited 
only to those who have committed low-level crimes. 
Part I will tell the stories of three people—Allison, Jane, and Angelo—who 
were convicted in Ohio of aggravated assault, sexual conduct with a minor, and 
murder, respectively. Each has been impoverished, in the broadest sense, 
because of their criminal record, and they share in common society’s 
dehumanization.21 Each wishes the state would forget their criminal pasts, but 
the nature of their crimes makes them ineligible for relief.22 
In the nearly five decades that Ohio has allowed record sealing, the list of 
eligible offenses has narrowed substantially.23 Part II will trace the evolution of 
 
 17 See Pierre H. Bergeron & Kimberly A. Eberwine, One Step in the Right Direction: 
Ohio’s Framework for Sealing Criminal Records, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 595, 596 (2005); Love, 
Starting Over with a Clean Slate, supra note 4, at 1723–24; 50-State Comparison, supra note 
16. 
 18 50-State Comparison, supra note 16. 
 19 Compare, e.g., Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate, supra note 4, at 1726 
(“Though expungement still finds its occasional champion in the academic literature, in 
theory and practice it is an unsatisfactory solution to the problem of restoring rights and 
status” particularly given the “technological realities of the information age” which allow 
the “broader public posting and private dissemination of criminal history information”), with 
Brian M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters?: Prosecutorial Discretion and Expungement, 
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2840–41 (2018) (although recognizing that “[t]echnological 
advancements regarding big data—in terms of its dissemination and its concealment—
complicate th[e] debate” regarding the efficacy of expungement, justifying it as a remedy 
because “it recognizes payment of the debt by the offender and that the road to rehabilitation 
is either complete or the path being definitively taken by the ex-offender”). 
 20 See Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate, supra note 4, at 1726. 
 21 See Telephone Interview with Jane Doe (June 29, 2020) [hereinafter Doe Interview] 
(on file with author) (“I made a mistake, a really bad one, but I am a mother. I have goals. I 
am trying to prove myself. . . . Don’t just look [at my record] and decide who I am.”); 
Telephone Interview with Angelo Robinson (June 25, 2020) [hereinafter Robinson 
Interview] (on file with author) (“It’s hard to reach for the stars when you have something 
anchoring you down. You’re judged by your criminal record. Everything goes by what’s on 
paper rather than the character of the individual.”). 
 22 Robinson Interview, supra note 25; Text message from Jane Doe to David Singleton, 
Exec. Dir., Ohio Justice & Policy Ctr. (June 16, 2020) (on file with author) (“[Y]ou ask… 
what it would mean to me… to have my charges dropped… I don’t think . . . any words [can] 
describe the joy and relief I would feel.”). 
 23 See Am. Sub. S.B. 18, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36(D)–(E) (Ohio 
2007) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36 to limit the number of offenses eligible 
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Ohio’s record sealing provisions and discuss how the “otherizing” of violent 
and sexual offenders engendered by media coverage may have impacted the 
legislature’s decision to scale back the offenses eligible for sealing. 
In contrast, Part III examines how public sympathy led Ohio to create a 
process for expunging the criminal records of human trafficking victims. The 
moral is clear: sympathy matters, and if people like Allison, Jane, and Angelo 
are ever to obtain criminal record relief, stories like theirs must be used to move 
the public and the legislature to embrace extending criminal record relief to 
those who have committed serious crimes. 
Part IV concludes by allowing Allison, Jane, and Angelo to explain, in their 
own words, what being able to leave their record behind would mean to them, 
and why we should care. 
II. “I’M NOT THAT PERSON ANYMORE” 
According to Michelle Alexander, criminal records legitimize 
discrimination against those convicted of crimes: “The ‘whites only’ signs may 
be gone, but new signs have gone up—notices placed in job applications, rental 
agreements, loan applications, forms for welfare benefits, school applications, 
and petitions for licenses, informing the general public that ‘felons’ are not 
wanted here.”24 
In Ohio alone, there are nearly one thousand laws restricting people with 
criminal records from working, acquiring professional licenses, or obtaining 
government contracts.25 These include both mandatory prohibitions (e.g., OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 4765.301, which bars a person with a felony conviction from 
working as an emergency medical technician)26 and discretionary restrictions 
(e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 4709.13, which permits the state cosmetology 
and barber board to deny a barber’s license to an applicant with a felony 
record).27 
But as the following narratives demonstrate, a criminal record also imposes 
intangible burdens: it kills dreams and dehumanizes. 
 
for record sealing); Am. Sub. S.B. 123, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.31 (Ohio 
2004) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36 to limit the number of offenses eligible 
for record sealing); Am. Sub. H.B. 335, 120th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36 (Ohio 
1994) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36 to limit the number of offenses eligible 
for record sealing); Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate, supra note 4, at 1723–24 n.74. 
 24 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLOR BLINDNESS 176 (The New Press 2020). 
 25 Ohio Justice & Policy Center, Civil Impacts of Criminal Convictions Under Ohio Law 
(CIVICC), https://civicc.opd.ohio.gov/ (follow “get started” hyperlink; then follow “search 
by civil impact” hyperlink; then search by keyword using terms “license”, “work”, and 
“government contract”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).  
 26 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4765.301(C) (West 2020). 
 27 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4709.13(B)(1) (West 2020). 
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A. Allison Nelson 
In 1992,  Allison Nelson28 argued with her boyfriend.29 When the argument 
turned violent, she stabbed him in what she believed was self-defense.30 The 
state disagreed and charged her with felonious assault.31 She pleaded guilty to 
aggravated assault, a lesser offense.32 
Although the court sentenced Allison to one year in prison,33 she was 
furloughed after serving approximately seven months.34 While she spent several 
months renovating houses as part of a vocational program, she dreamed of 
pursuing more education.35 
Eighteen months after her release, Allison received her Bachelor of Arts in 
English and Political Science.36 And in June 1998, she obtained a master’s 
degree in African and African American Studies with a concentration in African 
Studies.37 
A year before earning her master’s, in anticipation of applying to law 
school,38 Allison tried to put her criminal conviction behind her and applied to 
have her record sealed under OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.32.39 The court granted 
 
 28 “Allison” is a pseudonym used to protect her identity. 
 29 Telephone Interview with Allison Nelson (Feb. 11, 2020) [hereinafter Nelson 
Interview] (on file with author).  
 30 See id. 
 31 Indictment for: Felonious Assault at 2, State v. [redacted], Hamilton C.P. No. 
[redacted] (May 27, 1992) (on file with author).  
 32 Judgment of Allison Nelson of Oct. 2, 1992 (on file with author). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Nelson Interview, supra note 29.   
 35 See id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Allison’s aggravated assault conviction would not necessarily have resulted in her 
being denied admission to law school. See OHIO SUPREME COURT, SUMMARY OF CHARACTER 
AND FITNESS PROCESS IN OHIO 4, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/character 
Fit/CFProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A59-BEQV] (“There is no per se bar to admission for 
applicants with felony records. However, an applicant who has a felony record must prove 
full and complete rehabilitation and satisfy special temporal and substantive conditions. The 
applicant is also subject to additional scrutiny, including a mandatory review by the Board, 
even if a local Admissions Committee has recommended an unqualified approval of the 
applicant. Applicants who have been convicted of the most serious kinds of felonies—
aggravated murder, murder, or any first or second degree felony under Ohio law—must 
undergo yet another review by, and receive approval from, the Supreme Court itself.”). 
 39 See Entry Granting Application for Expungement of Conviction at 1, State v. 
[redacted], Hamilton C.P. No. [redacted] (July 28, 1998) [hereinafter Expungement Grant] 
(on file with author). Though the legislature denominated OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.52 
as an “expungement” statute, the relief it provided was record sealing. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2953.52 (West 2020). 
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her request40 but later vacated its order41 after discovering that an earlier petty 
theft conviction made Allison ineligible for relief.42 
That setback did not deter her from pursuing other dreams. Ten years after 
completing her master’s degree, she earned a Ph.D. in Educational Studies, then 
left Ohio for Washington, D.C.43 She soon landed a job as an adjunct faculty 
member at a local university’s community college division where she taught 
English.44 She eventually moved to the main campus where she taught a variety 
of courses.45 
Allison did not get rich teaching. The university paid her only $4,500 per 
class, and with other part-time work, Allison estimates she earned $40,000 to 
$45,000 yearly, which she had to stretch to live in an expensive city.46 “I was 
hustling,” she says.47 
Allison believes that her criminal record did not hold her back 
professionally in D.C.48 To her knowledge, employers there only performed a 
local police check and did not look to see whether she had convictions in other 
jurisdictions.49 But her record began to impact her when she moved back to 
Ohio in August 2019.50 
Believing that she could be “profoundly impactful” to secondary-school-
aged students, Allison sought work as an “educational interventionist” who 
could redirect troubled students onto the right path.51 The message she wanted 
to give them was simple: “You can do this, too. And I’ve made a mistake.”52 
But schools could not hire her because her aggravated assault conviction 
disqualified her from obtaining a license.53 Allison does not believe that she 
should be considered a danger to children simply because of an offense she 
committed almost thirty years ago.54 
 
 40 Expungement Grant, supra note 39, at 1.  
 41 Entry Vacating Expungement Order, at 1, State v. [redacted], Hamilton C.P. No. 
[redacted] (Jan. 8, 1999) (on file with author). 
 42 See Motion to Vacate Expungement Order at 2, State v. [redacted], Hamilton C.P. 
No. [redacted] (Dec. 4, 1998) (on file with author). 
 43 Nelson Interview, supra note 29.   
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Nelson Interview, supra note 29.   
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.31(C) (West 2020) (“Upon learning of . . . a 
conviction of any of the offenses listed in this division [which include aggravated assault, 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.12 (West 2020),] by a person who . . . is an applicant for a 
license . . . the state board or the superintendent of public instruction . . . shall by a written 
order . . . deny issuance . . . of the license to the person.”). 
 54 Nelson Interview, supra note 29.   
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With $80,000 in student loan debt, Allison has abandoned her dream of 
teaching, and the only job she has been able to find is delivering packages for 
Amazon.55 “Not my lane, not my wheelhouse,” she says of her job.56 “I want to 
do what I was trained to do. Being an educator. That’s my calling.”57 
B. Jane Doe 
On a September morning in 2006, Jane58 stood before an Ohio judge at a 
sexual offender classification hearing.59 Three months earlier she pleaded guilty 
to one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor.60 The state alleged that 
then-twenty-four-year-old Jane had sex with a boy she “knew was 13 years of 
age or older, but was less than 16 years of age,” or that she “was reckless” with 
regard to the boys age, and that she was “ten or more years older” than the boy.61 
Until her guilty plea, Jane had no criminal record (though she had been cited for 
minor misdemeanor possession of marijuana, the equivalent of a traffic ticket).62  
At the time of her hearing, Ohio had three sexual offenders classifications.63 
“Sexually oriented offender” was the lowest level, requiring designated 
individuals to register once a year for ten years.64 “Habitual sexual offender” 
was the intermediate category, requiring annual registration for twenty years, 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Jane is a pseudonym used to protect her identity. It is also the name she used in the 
litigation. See Doe v. DeWine, 99 F. Supp. 3d 809, 812 (S.D. Ohio 2015), rev’d on other 
grounds, 910 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 59 See Entry of Classification and Notice of Duties to Register as an Offender of a 
Sexually Oriented or Child-Victim Oriented Offense at 1, State v. [redacted], Hamilton C.P. 
No. [redacted] (Sept. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Entry of Classification and Notice of Duties to 
Register] (on file with author). Unless otherwise indicated, the facts of Jane’s circumstances, 
as presented here, were provided by her to the author. The notes of conversations with Jane 
are on file with the author. 
 60 See Entry Withdrawing Plea of Not Guilty and Entering a Plea of Guilty at 1, State 
v. [redacted], Hamilton C.P. No. [redacted] (June 13, 2006) (on file with author).  
 61 Indictment at 2, State v. [redacted], Hamilton C.P. No. [redacted] (Mar. 24, 2005) 
(on file with author). The indictment did not list Jane’s age. The author has determined her 
age at the time of the offense through other means related to his representation of her.  
 62 The author ascertained this information from the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts 
website using Jane’s real name. Search Name in Criminal & Traffic Records, HAMILTON 
CTY. CLERK OF COURTS, https://www.courtclerk.org/records-search/search-by-name/ 
[https://perma.cc/UG4D-8ZKX] (enter last name, enter first name, enter date of birth, press 
“search”). 
 63 State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St. 3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶¶ 24–28 
(describing Ohio’s three-tiered classification system). Community notification refers to the 
requirement that the sheriff mail notification to the neighbors of a certain people required to 
register as sexual offenders. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.11 (West 2005) (amended 
2006 and 2012). 
 64 Bodyke ¶ 24. 
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with possible community notification.65 And “sexual predator,” the most serious 
classification, required registration every ninety days for the rest of the 
individual’s life, with community notification required.66 In order to be labeled 
a predator, the court had to find clear and convincing evidence that the person 
was likely to commit one or more sexual offenses in the future.67 
The judge labeled Jane a sexual predator, citing “evidence of sexual 
relationship with underage girl (16),”—even though sixteen is the age of consent 
in Ohio—and Jane’s own “history of emotional problems[,] and sexual abuse,” 
as well as “substance abuse that [Jane] minimized.”68 The court also noted that 
a “diagnosis of pedophilia [could] not be ruled out,”69 even though there was no 
evidence that Jane was sexually attracted to prepubescent children.70 Finally, 
the court used Jane’s juvenile record to suggest that she had “antisocial 
attitudes.”71 
Under an earlier version of Ohio law, a sexual predator classification could 
be reviewed every five years.72 But in 2003, the legislature eliminated this 
opportunity.73 
Jane’s conviction and classification has had a devastating impact on her life. 
She already had two young children when she was convicted.74 In the years 
since, Jane, a single mother, has had four additional children.75 Finding a 
suitable home has proven particularly challenging.76 Because she has a lifetime 
registration requirement, Jane is ineligible to live in public housing,77 and she 
 
 65 Id. ¶ 25. 
 66 Id. ¶ 26. 
 67 See State v. Eppinger, 91 Ohio St. 3d 158, 163, 743 N.E.2d 881, 886–87 (2001) 
(citing OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2950.01(E), .09(B)(3)). 
 68 Entry of Classification and Notice of Duties to Register as an Offender of a Sexually 
Oriented or Child-Victim Oriented Offense, supra note 59, at 2. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 697–700 (5th ed. 2013) (describing the diagnostic criteria and features of 
pedophilic disorder).  
 71 Entry of Classification & Notice of Duties to Register, supra note 59, at 2. 
 72 See Doe v. DeWine, 99 F. Supp. 3d 809, 813–14 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (describing 
former OHIO REV. CODE § 2950.09(D)(1), which allowed a person labeled a sexual predator 
to challenge her designation one year after conviction and every five years thereafter, and 
how the legislature amended the statute to eliminate the opportunity to petition for 
reclassification), rev’d on other grounds, 910 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 73 Id. at 814. 
 74 Doe Interview, supra note 21.  
 75 See Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea at 2, State v. [redacted], 
Hamilton C.P. No. [redacted] (Aug. 16, 2020) (on file with author). 
 76 Complaint at 6, Doe v. DeWine, 99 F. Supp. 3d 809 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (No. 1:12-cv-
846) [hereinafter Doe Complaint]. 
 77 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(a)(4) (2019); 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a)(2)(i) (2019). 
2020] RESTORING HUMANITY 1021 
and her children have at times been homeless.78 They currently live in a vermin-
infested rental house rife with code violations.79 Jane wants to find better 
housing for her family, but her predator label makes it all but impossible.80 
Her criminal record and childcare responsibilities have also made finding 
work difficult. She has worked odd jobs where she can find them but has mostly 
been unemployed and dependent on public assistance.81 Still, she has managed 
to find ways to make ends meet for her family and to attend the local community 
college on and off as she works towards a business degree.82 When she 
completes her education, she hopes to work in a non-profit so she can give 
back.83 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of her classification is the impact on her 
children. In the past, when she has moved, the sheriff sent postcards to her new 
neighbors informing them of her presence, resulting in her children being teased 
by other children.84 Jane believes that “[her] children [should] no longer have 
to pay for [her] mistakes.”85 
Jane has committed no additional sex offenses.86 Her only other conviction 
was for failure to register as a sexual predator, an offense that occurred when 
she simply forgot to show for one of her quarterly registration appointments.87 
She pleaded guilty to that crime and received probation.88 
In 2012, she filed a federal lawsuit alleging that the classification statute 
violated her right to due process by labeling her as currently dangerous without 
allowing her an opportunity to prove otherwise.89 After many years of litigation, 
the district court agreed and declared the statute’s classification provisions 
unconstitutional.90 Jane’s victory was short-lived, however: a unanimous panel 
of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision,91 and Jane’s hope of 
one day being removed from the sex offender registry vanished. 
Desperate does not begin to describe just how badly Jane wishes she could 
escape the burdens of her classification.  
 
 78 See Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, supra note 75, at 2. 
On one occasion, the author had to arrange for emergency housing for Jane and her family 
when they suddenly became homeless. See id. 
 79 Id. at 3.  
80 Id. at 3–4. 
 81 Id. at 3. 
 82 Doe Interview, supra note 21.  
 83 Id. 
 84 Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, supra note 75, at 4. 
 85 Text message from Jane Doe to David Singleton, Exec. Dir., Ohio Justice & Policy 
Ctr. (June 20, 2020) (on file with author). 
 86 Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, supra note 75, at 2. 
 87 See id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Doe Complaint, supra note 76, at 2.  
 90 Doe v. DeWine, 910 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 91 Id. at 854. 
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[I] don’t think [there are] any words to describe the joy and relief I would feel 
in my heart[.] [I]t’s been almost 15 [years.] I’ve struggled and lost a lot of good 
opportunities, and dealt with a lot of pain, because of my past[. H]aving a 
second [c]hance would change my life tremendously.92 
Yet, Jane knows she has no one to blame for her situation and accepts full 
responsibility. Reflecting the shame and remorse she feels, Jane states: “I feel 
awful about my crime. [An adult having sex with a minor] is not something I 
would ever want to have happen [to] my children . . . . I definitely feel a lot of 
remorse.”93 
C. Angelo Robinson 
Angelo Robinson94 became a free man on August 1, 2019, after spending 
twenty-two years in prison for murder and drug possession.95 His case stemmed 
from a 1997 incident occurring in an apartment that he and several associates, 
including his friend Veronica, were using to sell crack cocaine.96 Angelo had 
positioned himself in a back room, guarding the drugs behind a closed door.97 
All was proceeding normally until Angelo heard a commotion at the front door, 
then gunshots.98 Angelo knew what this meant: he and his associates were being 
robbed and were about to get killed in a gunfight.99 He then heard something hit 
the door he was behind.100 Fearing that he was about to be shot, he fired three 
shots through the door.101 Unbeknownst to him, Veronica was the person on the 
other side of the door, and the noise he heard was her attempt to escape the hail 
of bullets that the robbers were firing.102 One of Angelo’s bullets hit Veronica 
in the chest, killing her.103 
Believing that he had acted in self-defense, Angelo turned down the 
prosecution’s plea bargain, gambling that he could convince the jury to find him 
 
 92 Text message from Jane Doe to David Singleton, Exec. Dir., Ohio Justice & Policy 
Ctr. (June 16, 2020) (on file with author). 
 93 Doe Interview, supra note 21.  
 94 Mr. Robinson consented to the use of his real name.  
 95 Barbara Bradley Hagerty, The Presence of Justice: Releasing People from Prison Is 
Easier Said than Done, ATLANTIC (July 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ 
2020/07/releasing-people-prison/613741/ [https://perma.cc/BGX6-UTH5]; see Judgment 
Entry: Sentence: Incarceration, State v. Robinson, Hamilton C.P. No. B 971412 (Oct. 8, 
1997).  
 96 State v. Robinson, 726 N.E.2d 581, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st 1999). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Hagerty, supra note 95.  
 99 See id. 
 100 See Robinson, 726 N.E.2d at 583. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See id.; Hagerty, supra note 95. 
 103 Robinson, 726 N.E.2d at 583.  
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not guilty.104 He lost.105 The jury convicted him of murder,106 and the court 
sentenced him to twenty-nine years to life in prison.107 Angelo would first be 
eligible for parole in 2026, but release was not guaranteed.108 In fact, the Parole 
Board’s custom is to deny release no matter how well a prisoner has behaved.109 
Angelo did not let this uncertainty discourage him. He took every program 
available to him while incarcerated, and, among many accomplishments, earned 
his GED, became certified to drive a forklift, learned Spanish, and even taught 
himself to play the guitar.110 
Angelo’s legal team convinced the local prosecutor that Angelo had 
transformed himself and that it was unfair for him to continue to be locked up 
when, had he accepted the plea bargain, he would have completed his sentence 
eight years earlier.111 With the blessing of Veronica’s family, the prosecutor 
agreed not to oppose Angelo’s motion for a new trial if Angelo agreed to plead 
guilty to manslaughter.112 Although the grounds for his motion were tenuous,113 
the judge approved the arrangement, vacated Angelo’s murder conviction, and 
granted a new trial.114 Angelo promptly pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was 
released with time served.115 
With his legal team’s help, Angelo found what he considers to be a “good” 
job with a local tool factory.116 His employer pays for him to attend college so 
he can progress through the company.117 During the day, he works at the tool 
 
 104 Campbell Robertson, Would You Let the Man Who Killed Your Sister Out of Prison?, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/us/violent-crime-ohio-
prison.html [https://perma.cc/9HVE-BTCP]. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Jury Verdict, State v. Robinson, Hamilton C.P. No. B-971412 (Oct. 8, 1997); see 
Entry Granting Defendant’s Unopposed Motion for New Trial, State v. Robinson, Hamilton 
C.P. No. B-971412 (July 29, 2019) [hereinafter Entry Granting New Trial]. 
 107 Hagerty, supra note 95. 
 108 Robertson, supra note 104. 
 109 Complaint at 10, Head v. Ohio Parole Board, Franklin C.P. No. 18CV002735 (Mar. 
30, 2018) (challenging Board’s practice of denying parole automatically to people seeking 
release at their first hearing). The author has represented numerous people before the Ohio 
Parole Board. E.g., id. at 14. It is common for the Board not to release people at their initial 
eligibility hearing. Id. at 10. 
 110 Hagerty, supra note 95; see Robertson, supra note 104. 
 111 Id. 
 112 See Hagerty, supra note 95. 
 113 See generally OHIO R. CRIM. P. 33(A) (listing grounds for seeking new trial). In the 
author’s opinion, Angelo’s motion did not clearly fit the grounds set forth under the rule. 
 114 Entry Granting New Trial, supra note 106. 
 115 Entry Withdrawing Plea of Not Guilty and Entering Plea of Guilty to an Agreed 
Sentence at 1, State v. Robinson, Hamilton C.P. No. B-971412 (Aug. 7, 2019). 
 116 See Hagerty, supra note 95. 
 117 Id. 
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factory; at night, he works in construction.118 With his two jobs, Angelo has 
saved enough for a down payment on a home.119 
Although he has achieved many of his goals, Angelo feels held back by his 
criminal record and wishes he could have it erased.120 But this is impossible 
under current Ohio law,121 and Angelo believes this is unfair: “I’m not that 
person anymore, the young man who sold drugs and a [sic] carried a gun. I’ve 
changed.”122 
But one thing will never change: the deep remorse Angelo feels about 
killing Veronica. “I’m ashamed[.] I’m embarrassed[.] I’m disappointed[.] I’m 
disgusted in myself,” Angelo writes.123 Depression over Veronica’s death “is 
the most horrible feeling that I’m living with and there is nothing that will ever 
compare.”124 The only way for him to cope, he says, is “keep[ing] busy[.]”125 
III. CRIMINAL RECORD SEALING IN OHIO 
Allison, Jane, and Angelo share several things in common. Each made 
serious mistakes, for which they were punished. Each has demonstrated, through 
their conduct, that they pose no danger to society. Each feels constrained in 
some way by their criminal records. And each would like to have society forget 
their criminal pasts. But the nature of their offenses makes each ineligible for 
criminal record relief.126 
This Part will discuss the evolution of Ohio’s record sealing law from its 
enactment in 1973 to today and offer a possible explanation for why, in that 
time, Ohio has gone from broadly offering relief to substantially limiting its 
availability.  
A. Limiting Eligibility 
1. The 1973 Statute 
The Ohio legislature enacted the state’s first record-sealing law in 1973.127 
Although called an “expungement” statute,128 this was a misnomer, as the 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Robinson Interview, supra note 21.  
 121 See discussion infra Part III.A.5. 
 122 See Text message from Angelo Robinson to David Singleton, Exec. Dir., Ohio 
Justice & Policy Ctr. (June 27, 2020) (on file with author).  
 123 Text message from Angelo Robinson to David Singleton, Exec. Dir., Ohio Justice & 
Policy Ctr. (June 29, 2020) (on file with author).  
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36 (2020). 
 127 See Am. Sub. S.B. No. 5, 110th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. §§ 2953.31–.36 (Ohio 
1973) (codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.31–.36 (1975)). 
 128 See id. 
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statute provided not for the destruction of any case documents but for the sealing 
of “official” records and the deletion of all index references.129 
According to the legislature, the law’s purpose was to “restore[] the person 
[who is the] subject [of the order] to all rights and privileges not otherwise 
restored by termination of the sentence or probation or by final release on 
parole.”130 The statute provided that “[i]n any application for 
employment . . . , a person may be questioned only with respect to convictions 
not expunged, unless the question bears a direct and substantial relationship to 
the position for which the person is being considered.”131 
The original statute only permitted “first offenders” to have their 
convictions sealed,132 defining “first offender” as “anyone who has once been 
convicted of an offense in this state or any other jurisdiction.”133 In addition to 
being a “first offender”, the applicant must: (1) have waited the requisite time 
period after final discharge;134 (2) have no criminal proceedings pending at time 
of application;135 (3) have demonstrated rehabilitation to the satisfaction of the 
trial judge;136 and (4) have shown that expunging the conviction served the 
public interest.137 
The statute broadly permitted sealing except for offenses that were 
ineligible for probation,138 so the only ineligible offenses were aggravated 
murder, murder, and offenses committed with a firearm or other “dangerous 
ordnance.”139 Two years later, the most serious sexual offenses, rape and 
felonious sexual penetration,140 became ineligible for probation and therefore 
 
 129 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C) (LexisNexis 1975). 
 130 Id. § 2953.33(A). 
 131 Id. § 2953.33(B); see, e.g., In re Application of Davis, 403 N.E.2d 189, 190 n.* (Ohio 
1980). 
 132 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(A) (LexisNexis 1975).  
 133 Id. § 2953.31. The definition further provided that “[w]hen two or more convictions 
result from or are connected with the same act, or result from offenses committed at the same 
time, they shall be counted as one conviction.” Id. 
 134 Id. § 2953.32(A).  
 135 Id. § 2953.32(C). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36 (LexisNexis 1975) (“Sections 2953.31 to 2953.35 
of the Revised Code do not apply to convictions when the offender is not eligible for 
probation, or convictions under Chapter 4507, 4511, or 4549 of the Revised Code.”). 
Chapters 4507, 4511, and 4549 relate to various traffic laws. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. XLV 
(West 2020). 
 139 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(F) (LexisNexis 1975); see, e.g., State v. Collins, 
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 43168, 1981 WL 4990, at *1–2 (May 28, 1981) (holding that a 
conviction of attempted aggravated assault was sealable where the record did not indicate 
that a gun was used during the crime). 
 140 Am. Sub. S.B. 144, 111th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 2907.02(A)–(B), .12(A)–(B) 
(Ohio 1975) (only rape and felonious sexual penetration were first-degree felonious sexual 
offenses at the time). 
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sealing.141 And beginning in 1988, bail forfeitures in traffic cases could no 
longer be sealed.142 
2. The 1994 Amendment 
In 1994, the legislature substantially narrowed the eligible offenses143 by 
specifically precluding the sealing of rape,144 sexual battery,145 corruption of a 
minor,146 gross sexual imposition,147 sexual imposition,148 felonious sexual 
penetration,149 pandering obscenity involving a minor,150 pandering sexually-
 
 141 See id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE § 2951.02(F) to include offenses which violated 
Section 2907.02 (rape) and Section 2907.12 (felonious sexual penetration)). 
 142 Am. Sub. H.B. 175, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36 (Ohio 1988) 
(amending OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.36). 
 143 See Am. Sub. H.B. 335, 120th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36 (Ohio 1994) 
(amending OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.36 to encompass additional offenses from the original 
1974 implementation of the statute). The new section read:  
Sections 2953.31 to 2953.35 of the Revised Code do not apply to convictions when the 
offender is not eligible for probation, convictions under [Sections] 2907.02, 2907.03, 
2907.04, 2907.05, 2907.06, 2907.12, 2907.321, 2907.322, or 2907.323 or Chapter 
4507., 4511., or 4549. of the Revised Code, or bail forfeitures in a traffic case as defined 
in Traffic Rule 2.  
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36 (West 1994). 
 144 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 1994). Specifically precluding rape was 
redundant because, as previously discussed, it was already not sealable as a result of being 
ineligible for probation under OHIO REV. CODE § 2951.02(F)(4). See supra, notes 140–41 
and accompanying text.  
 145 Ohio H.B. 335 § 2953.36. The enacted bill specified that §§ 2953.31–.35 do not 
apply to those convicted under Section 2907.03, which is the section of the Revised Code 
that prohibits sexual battery. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 1994). 
 146 Ohio H.B. 335 § 2953.36. The enacted bill specified that §§ 2953.31–.35 do not 
apply to those convicted under Section 2907.04, which is the section of the Revised Code 
that prohibits corruption of a minor. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (West 1994). 
 147 Ohio H.B. 335 § 2953.36. The enacted bill specified that §§ 2953.31–.35 do not 
apply to those convicted under Section 2907.05, which is the section of the Revised Code 
that prohibits gross sexual imposition. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05 (West 1994). 
 148 Ohio H.B. 335 § 2953.36. The enacted bill specified that §§ 2953.31–.35 do not 
apply to those convicted under Section 2907.06, which is the section of the Revised Code 
that prohibits sexual imposition. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06 (West 1994). 
 149 Ohio H.B. 335 § 2953.36. The enacted bill specified that §§ 2953.31–.35 do not 
apply to those convicted under Section 2907.12, which was the section of the Revised Code 
that prohibited felonious sexual penetration. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.12 (West 1994) 
(repealed 1996). For the same reason as previously discussed, specifying felonious sexual 
penetration was redundant. See supra notes 137–38, 141 and accompanying text.  
 150 Ohio H.B. 335 § 2953.36. The enacted bill specified that §§ 2953.31–.35 do not 
apply to those convicted under Section 2907.321, which is the section of the Revised Code 
that prohibits pandering obscenity involving a minor. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.321 
(West 1994). 
2020] RESTORING HUMANITY 1027 
oriented matter involving a minor,151 and illegal use of a minor in nudity-
oriented material or performance.152 Therefore, the amendment made seven153 
additional sexual offenses ineligible for record sealing even though those 
offenses remained probation-eligible.154 
3. The 2004 Amendment 
Changes effective on January 1, 2004155 made the following additional 
offenses ineligible: violent offenses when the offense is a first-degree 
 
 151 Ohio H.B. 335 § 2953.36. The enacted bill specified that Sections 2953.31–.35 do 
not apply to those convicted under Section 2907.322, which is the section of the Revised 
Code that prohibits pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor. OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2907.322 (West 1994). 
 152 Ohio H.B. 335 § 2953.36. The enacted bill specified that Sections 2953.31–.35 do 
not apply to those convicted under Section 2907.323, which is the section of the Revised 
Code that prohibits illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance. OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323 (West 1994). 
 153 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.12 
(West 1994) (repealed 1996); see supra notes 140–41, 144 and accompanying text 
(indicating that rape and felonious sexual assault were redundant inclusions in this revision). 
Given that nine new offenses are listed, see supra note 143, and two were already 
encompassed by § 2953.36, seven offenses were newly ineligible for sealing. 
 154 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(F) (West 1994) (specifying only rape and 
felonious sexual penetration as sexual offenses requiring mandatory prison terms).  
 155 Am. Sub. S.B. 123, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36 (Ohio 2004) 
(amending OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.36). The amended text read: 
Sections 2953.31 to 2953.35 of the Revised Code do not apply to any of the following: 
 
(A) Convictions when the offender is subject to a mandatory prison term; 
 
(B) Convictions under section 2907.02, 2907.03, 2907.04, 2907.05, 2907.06, 2907.321, 
2907.322, or 2907.323, former section 2907.12, or Chapter 4507., 4510., 4511., or 4549. 
of the Revised Code, or a conviction for a violation of a municipal ordinance that is 
substantially similar to any section contained in any of those chapters; 
 
(C) convictions of an offense of violence when the offense is a misdemeanor of the first 
degree or a felony and when the offense is not a violation of section 2917.03 of the 
Revised Code [riot] and is not a violation of section 2903.13 [assault], 2917.01 [inciting 
to violence] or 2917.31 [inducing panic] of the Revised Code that is a misdemeanor of 
the first degree; 
 
(D) Convictions of an offense in circumstances in which the victim of the offense was 
under eighteen years of age when the offense is a misdemeanor of the first degree or a 
felony; 
 
(E) Convictions of a felony of the first or second degree; 
 
(F) Bail forfeitures in a traffic case as defined in Traffic Rule 2. 
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misdemeanor or a felony,156 convictions where the victim is under eighteen 
years of age and the offense is a first-degree misdemeanor or a felony,157 and 
convictions for first- and second-degree felonies.158 
4. The 2007 Amendment 
In 2007, the legislature again broadened the list of ineligible offenses.159 As 
a result, the following sexual offenses became ineligible when committed 
 
Id. 
 156 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36(C) (West 2004) (current version at OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2953.36(A)(3) (West 2016)). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(9) (West 
2003) defined “offense of violence” as  
a violation of Ohio Revised Code Sections 2903.01 [aggravated murder], 2903.02 
[murder], 2903.03 [voluntary manslaughter], 2903.04 [involuntary manslaughter], 
2903.11 [felonious assault], 2903.12 [aggravated assault], 2903.13 [assault], 2903.15 
[permitting child abuse], 2903.21 [aggravated menacing], 2903.211 [menacing by 
stalking], 2903.22 [menacing], 2905.01 [kidnapping], 2905.02 [abduction], 2905.11 
[extortion], 2907.02 [rape], 2907.03 [sexual battery], 2907.05 [gross sexual imposition], 
2909.02 [aggravated arson], 2909.03 [arson], 2909.24 [terrorism], 2911.01 [aggravated 
robbery], 2911.02 [robbery], 2911.11 [aggravated burglary], 2917.01 [inciting to 
violence], 2917.02 [aggravated riot], 2917.03 [riot], 2917.31 [inducing panic], 2919.25 
[domestic violence], 2921.03 [intimidation], 2921.04 [intimidation of an attorney, 
victim, or witness in criminal case], 2921.34 [escape], or 2923.161 [improperly 
discharging firearm at or into habitation or school zone], of division (A)(1) of section 
2903.34 [patient abuse by residential care facility employees], of division (A)(1), (2), 
or (3) of section 2911.12 [burglary], or of division (B)(1), (2), (3), or (4) of section 
2919.22 of the Revised Code [endangering children] or felonious sexual penetration in 
violation of former section 2907.12 of the Revised Code. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(9) (West 2003). But misdemeanor assault, riot, inciting 
to violence, and inducing panic remain eligible for sealing. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2953.36(A)(3) (West 2016) (specifically delineating that the sections of the Revised Code 
associated with these offenses—Sections 2917.03, 2903.13, 2917.01, and 2917.31—are 
exceptions to the provisions of the revised Section 2953.36(C)). 
 157 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36(D) (West 2004) (amended 2012). 
 158 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36(E) (West 2004) (amended 2012). 
 159 Am. Sub. S.B. 18, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36 (Ohio 2007) (amending 
OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.36 to encompass additional offenses from the 2004 revision of the 
statute with the addition of § 2953.36(E): “Convictions on or after the effective date of this 
amendment under section 2907.08, 2907.09, 2907.21, 2907.22, 2907.23, 2907.31, 2907.311, 
2907.32, or 2907.33 of the Revised Code when the victim of the offense was under eighteen 
years of age . . .”). 
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against a victim under the age of eighteen: voyeurism,160 public indecency,161 
compelling prostitution,162 promoting prostitution,163 procuring prostitution,164 
disseminating matter harmful to juveniles,165 displaying matter harmful to 
juveniles,166 pandering obscenity,167 and deception to obtain matter harmful to 
juveniles.168 Additionally, the amendment precluded sealing the offense of 
importuning,169 regardless of the victim’s age.170 
 
 160 Am. Sub. S.B. 18, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36(E) (Ohio 2007). The 
enacted bill broadened Section 2953.36 to include offenses under Section 2907.08, which is 
the section of the revised code that prohibits voyeurism. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.08 
(West 2020) (originally effective 2001). 
 161 Ohio S.B. 18 § 2953.36(E). The enacted bill broadened Section 2953.36 to include 
offenses under Section 2907.09, which is the section of the revised code that prohibits public 
indecency. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.09 (West 2020) (originally effective 1996). 
 162 Ohio S.B. 18 § 2953.36(E). The enacted bill broadened Section 2953.36 to include 
offenses under Section 2907.21, which is the section of the revised code that prohibits 
compelling prostitution. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.21 (West 2020) (originally effective 
1996). 
 163 Ohio S.B. 18 § 2953.36(E). The enacted bill broadened Section 2953.36 to include 
offenses under Section 2907.22, which is the section of the revised code that prohibits 
promoting prostitution. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.22 (West 2020) (originally effective 
1996). 
 164 Ohio S.B. 18 § 2953.36(E). The enacted bill broadened Section 2953.36 to include 
offenses under Section 2907.23, which is the section of the revised code that prohibits 
procuring prostitution. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.23 (West 2020) (originally effective 
1974). 
 165 Ohio S.B. 18 § 2953.36(E). The enacted bill broadened Section 2953.36 to include 
offenses under Section 2907.31, which is the section of the revised code that prohibits 
disseminating matter harmful to juveniles. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.31 (West 2020) 
(originally effective 2004). 
 166 Ohio S.B. 18 § 2953.36(E). The enacted bill broadened Section 2953.36 to include 
offenses under Section 2907.311, which is the section of the revised code that prohibits 
displaying matter harmful to juveniles. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.311 (West 2020) 
(originally effective 1989). 
 167 Ohio S.B. 18 § 2953.36(E). The enacted bill broadened Section 2953.36 to include 
offenses under Section 2907.32, which is the section of the revised code that prohibits 
pandering obscenity. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.32 (West 2020) (originally effective 
1996). 
 168 Ohio S.B. 18 § 2953.36(E). The enacted bill broadened Section 2953.36 to include 
offenses under Section 2907.33, which is the section of the revised code that prohibits 
deception to obtain matter harmful to juveniles. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.33 (West 
2020) (originally effective 1974). 
 169 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36(D) (West 2007) (current version at OHIO REV. 
CODE § 2953.36(A)(4) (2016)) (adding the offense of importuning in its entirety). 
 170 See Ohio S.B. 18 § 2953.36(D).  
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5. The Current Situation 
With the 2007 amendments, the legislature appears to have finished limiting 
the offenses that can be sealed.171 Although the legislature has since jettisoned 
the “first offender” requirement and expanded record sealing for people who 
have committed multiple sealable offenses,172 it has not broadened the list of 
eligible offenses. So, in contrast to the situation in 1973, today, almost no violent 
or sexual offenses are eligible.173 
 
 171 Although there have been amendments made to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36 
since the 2007 amendments, none have—in the way the statute is implemented today—
resulted in the expansion of the list of offenses ineligible for record sealing. See Am. Sub. 
H.B. 56, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36(F) (Ohio 2016) (making offenses 
ineligible for sealing under Section 2953.36(F) if the victim was under sixteen, from 
eighteen); Am. Sub. H.B. 53, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36(B) (Ohio 2015) 
(adding provisions from Section 4506, but not in the current version of the statute); Am. Sub. 
S.B. 143, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36(B) (Ohio 2014) (limiting the offenses 
listed in Section 2953.36(B) to offenses not contained in Section 2953.61); Am. Sub. S.B. 
337, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36(D)–(E) (Ohio 2012) (textual update to 
reflect date of statute applicability). See also generally Am. Sub. H.B. 164, 131st Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2016) (allowing retroactive limitations on sealing). 
 172 In 2012, S.B. 337 (effective Sept. 28, 2012) amended OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.31 by 
replacing “[f]irst offender,” with “[e]ligible offender,” defined as: 
anyone who has been convicted of an offense in this state or any other jurisdiction and 
who has not more than one felony conviction, not more than two misdemeanor 
convictions if the convictions are not of the same offense, or not more than one felony 
conviction and one misdemeanor conviction in this state or any other jurisdiction.  
Am. Sub. S.B. 337, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.31(A) (Ohio 2012). 
  In 2018, S.B. 66 (effective Oct. 29, 2018) amended OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.31’s 
definition of “[e]ligible offender.” Am. Sub. S.B. 66, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
§ 2953.21(A)(1)(a) (Ohio 2018). Specifically, the amendment expanded the definition of 
“[e]ligible offender” to include “[a]nyone who has been convicted of one or more offenses, 
but not more than five felonies . . . if all of the offenses . . . are felonies of the fourth or fifth 
degree or misdemeanors and none of those offenses are an offense of violence or a felony 
sex offense.” Id. Under this new provision, a person can have up to five lower level felonies 
sealed and unlimited number of misdemeanors sealed subject to OHIO REV. CODE 
§ 2953.36’s restrictions. See id. 
  For individuals who are not deemed eligible for expanded record sealing under OHIO 
REV. CODE § 2953.31’s new division (A)(1)(a), perhaps because they have a conviction for 
a third degree felony, the amendment preserves the alternative definition of eligibility 
contained in the 2012 change: “[a]nyone who has been convicted of an offense . . . who has 
not more than one felony conviction, not more than two misdemeanor convictions, or not 
more than one felony conviction and one misdemeanor conviction in this state or any other 
jurisdiction,” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.31(A)(1)(b) (West 2020), subject, of course, to 
§ 2953.36’s limitations on which offenses are sealable. Id. § 2953.31. 
 173 But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36(A)(3) (West 2020) (convictions for 
misdemeanor assault, riot, inciting to violence, and inducing panic eligible for sealing despite 
being offenses of violence). Additionally, convictions for the following Chapter 2907 sex 
offenses are eligible for sealing; i.e., they are not named as exceptions in OHIO REV. CODE 
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B. Explaining Ohio’s Decision 
What prompted this dramatic narrowing? One likely answer: the politics of 
crime, as shaped by media coverage in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Politics play a key role in crime policy in the United States,174 as Dean 
Erwin Chemerinsky has described: “Elected officials—both Democrat and 
Republican—have an incentive to vote for any bill that increases the punishment 
for a crime. To do otherwise, is to risk giving political opponents a powerful 
tool at the time of the next election.”175 Although the Ohio amendments 
prohibiting the sealing of certain convictions did not increase punishment in the 
conventional sense (i.e., by increasing the sentence),176 the incentive to appear 
“tough” on violent and sexual offenders may very well have motivated at least 
some Ohio legislators to restrict record sealing. 
Moreover, news coverage of crime undoubtedly contributes to the passage 
of so-called “tough on crime” legislation.177 “Every generation has its high-
profile crime stories and media frenzies, which leave behind a trail of new 
criminal prohibitions.”178 These stories motivate legislators to appear tough on 
crime in order to (1) “reassure the public generally that their fears have been 
noted and that the causes of their fears have been acted on,” and (2) “curry public 
favor and electoral support by pandering, by making promises that the law can 
 
§ 2953.36: commercial sexual exploitation of a minor (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.19 
(West 2020)); soliciting / soliciting after positive HIV test (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.24 
(West 2020)); loitering to engage in solicitation / loitering to engage in solicitation after 
positive HIV test (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.241 (West 2020)); prostitution / prostitution 
after positive HIV test (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.25 (West 2020)); and compelling 
acceptance of objectionable material (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.34 (West 2020)). See 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36(A) (West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907 (West 
2020). 
 174 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 529–46 (2001) (discussing the political incentives legislators, prosecutors, police, and 
judges experience in shaping the criminal law).  
 175 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential but Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in 
Prison Reform, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307, 310 (2008). 
 176 See, e.g., City of Maple Heights v. McCants, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80128, 2002-
Ohio-1070, ¶ 20 (finding that a statutory amendment precluding domestic violence 
convictions from being sealed “simply foreclosed [defendant’s] opportunity to have his 
record sealed, which has been found not to violate the ban against ex post facto application 
of the law”). 
 177 See Katherine Beckett, Setting the Public Agenda: “Street Crime” and Drug Use in 
American Politics, 41 SOC. PROBS. 425, 426 (1994) (arguing that “the definitional activities 
of state actors and the mass media have played a crucial role in generating public concern 
about ‘street crime’ and drug use,” thus contributing to the setting of the public agenda and, 
in turn, “political debate and policy”); Mark Fishman, Crime Waves as Ideology, 25 SOC. 
PROBS. 531, 531 (1978) (contending that the media largely creates the notion of “crime 
waves”). 
 178 William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2558 (2004). 
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at best imperfectly and incompletely deliver.”179 Thus, “in criminal law, stories, 
not data, drive the policy analysis,”180 particularly stories that generate fear.181 
In 1973, the War on Crime was well underway.182 But by the end of the 
decade, Americans were not preoccupied with crime. In May 1978, only 3% of 
people surveyed in a Gallup Poll said crime was the most important problem 
facing the United States.183 By August 1994, however, that had grown to 
52%.184 
The public’s perception of an increase in crime did not match reality. 
Between 1978 and 1994, the actual number of crimes committed increased 
significantly less than the population growth rate.185 Thus, “the sharp jump in 
public perceptions of crime as the [most important problem] facing the U.S. 
could not have been caused by the increase in the actual total number of 
crimes.”186 
News coverage likely played a significant role in shaping public 
perception.187 During the 1990s, media reports of violent crime dominated the 
 
 179 Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two 
Centuries of Consistent Findings, in 38 CRIME & JUSTICE 65, 100–01 (Michael Torny ed., 
2009). 
 180 Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law as Regulation, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 316, 322 
(2014). 
 181 See Robert P. Mosteller, New Dimensions in Sentencing Reform in the Twenty-First 
Century, 82 OR. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003) (describing the use of convicted criminal Willie Horton 
in presidential campaign advertisement as “‘giving a face to the public’s worst fears, and 
perhaps tapping its worst instincts’”); Louis Michael Seidman, Hyper-Incarceration and 
Strategies of Disruption: Is There a Way Out?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 109, 112 (2011) 
(“Anyone who has studied the politics of crime control knows that it is driven at least as 
much by anger and fear as by careful cost-benefit calculations.”); Marc Mauer Sentencing 
Reform: Amid Mass Incarcerations—Guarded Optimism, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 27, 
27–28 (“[M]uch of what has been driving the politics of crime has been a ‘culture of fear,’ 
one in which policy makers have exploited such emotion for political gain.”). 
 182 John N. Mitchell, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Address Before the Attorney 
General’s Conference on Crime Reduction: “The War on Crime: The End of the Beginning” 
4 (Sept. 9, 1971) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/ 
legacy/2011/08/23/09-09-1971.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJL4-G6J3]) (drawing analogies of 
advancing fronts and enemy retreats to the state of the War on Crime). 
 183 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 178 (Michael J. Hildelang, Michael R. Gottfredson, & Timothy J. 
Flanagan eds., 1980). 
 184 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 100 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1997). 
 185 Dennis T. Lowry, Tarn Ching Josephine Nio, & Dennis W. Leitner, Setting the Public 
Fear Agenda: A Longitudinal Analysis of Network TV Crime Reporting, Public Perceptions 
of Crime, and FBI Crime Statistics, 53 J. COMM. 61, 62 (2003). 
 186 Id. 
 187 DAVID L. ALTHEIDE, CREATING FEAR: NEWS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CRISIS 21 
(2002); LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, OFF BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE & CRIME IN 
THE NEWS 5 (Apr. 2001), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/ 
off_balance.pdf [https://perma.cc/329M-84DM]; Lowry et al., supra note 185, at 64. 
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news.188 The adage “if it bleeds it leads”189 reflected the reality that crime 
accounted for more than 75% of local coverage in some markets.190 National 
news outlets also covered violent crimes, especially sensational ones.191 
In fact, while national crime rates fell 20% from 1990 to 1998, network 
television reporting of crime increased 83%.192 And not all crime coverage 
increased at the same rate. During that same period, network news coverage of 
homicides increased 473%, while the actual homicide rate decreased 32.9%.193 
The coverage often focused on violent crime committed by young African-
American males,194 and a new term emerged to describe these offenders: “super-
predators.”195 Warning of their threat in 1995, John Dilulio wrote, “On the 
horizon . . . are tens of thousands of severely morally impoverished juvenile 
super-predators . . . [who] are perfectly capable of committing the most heinous 
acts of physical violence for the most trivial reasons (for example, a perception 
of slight disrespect or the accident of being in their path).”196 News media 
“pounced on these sensational predictions and ran with them like a punt returner 
finding daylight.”197 Congress responded by passing the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which President Clinton signed into law.198 
Memorably, First Lady Hillary Clinton defended her husband’s signing of the 
bill as necessary to control “super-predators” who had “no conscience, no 
empathy,”199 concluding, “We can talk about why they ended up that way. But 
first we have to bring them to heel.”200 
While the nation was gripped with fear of “super-predators,” another type 
of “predator” emerged: convicted sex offenders. News coverage of sex crimes 
 
 188 See DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 187, at 9. 
 189 See generally MATTHEW R. KERBEL, IF IT BLEEDS, IT LEADS: AN ANATOMY OF 
TELEVISION NEWS (2000). 
 190 Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local 
Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 560 (2000). 
 191 DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 187, at 8–9. 
 192 Id. at 10. 
 193 Id. 
 194 See “Jake” James Cullen Evans, A Criminal Justice System Without Justice: The 
News Media, Sports Media, & Rap’s Influence on Racial Crime Disparities, 5 U. MIAMI 
RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 117, 118–19, 121 (2015) (describing African Americans as being 
overrepresented in news reports as perpetrators of violent crimes). 
 195 John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super--Predators, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 
Nov. 27, 1995, at 23. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-
superpredator-threat-of-90s.html [https://perma.cc/ZF9Q-L8HB]. 
 198 See generally Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
103–322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 199 C-SPAN, 1996: Hillary Clinton on “Superpredators” (C-SPAN), YOUTUBE (Feb. 
25, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0uCrA7ePno [https://perma.cc/6SLZ-V97B] 
(quoted language at 1:16 to 1:18).  
 200 Id. (quoted language at 1:18 to 1:22). 
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exploded in the mid-1990s as a result of sensational crimes201 like the sexual 
assault and murder of children like Megan Kanka,202 Megan’s Law’s 
namesake.203 Although child abductions and sexual assaults by strangers are 
rare204 and recidivism by sex offenders is much lower than conventional 
wisdom would indicate,205 the media’s focus on these horrific crimes painted 
the false picture that such offenses are common and recidivism inevitable.206 
Inevitably, sex offenders became social pariahs.207 
 
 201 David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture of Fear: The 
Case for More Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public Safety Laws, 3 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 600, 604–07 (2006). 
 202 On July 29, 1994, a neighbor lured seven-year-old Megan Kanka into his home where 
he raped and murdered her. Our Mission, MEGAN KANKA FOUND., http://www.megannicole 
kankafoundation.org/mission.htm [https://perma.cc/9PCN-NSMN]. 
 203 Enacted in 1996, Megan’s Law required the community notification of sex offenders. 
See generally Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996).  
 204 See HOWARD N. SNYDER, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF 
YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER 
CHARACTERISTICS 10 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/2GKU-Z34F] (finding that 92.9% of child sexual assault victims knew their 
perpetrator; 34.2% were family members, 58.7% were acquaintances, and only 7% of child 
victims reported that they were abused by strangers). 
 205 Jill S. Levenson, Yolanda N. Brannon, Timothy Fortney, & Juanita Baker, Public 
Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Policies, 7 ANALYSES SOC. 
ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 137, 142 (2007). 
 206 Emily Horowitz, Growing Media and Legal Attention to Sex Offenders: More Safety 
or More Injustice?, 7 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 143, 145 (2007) (“hyptohesiz[ing] that 
there has been an increase in media coverage of sex offenders during the past decade 
unrelated to a corresponding increase in sex offenses.”); Levenson et al., supra note 205, at 
153 (discussing the myth of high recidivism rates for sexual offenders). 
 207 David A. Singleton, Kids, Cops, and Sex Offenders: Pushing the Limits of the 
Interest-Convergence Thesis, 57 HOW. L.J. 353, 359 n.32 (2013); Cassie Dallas, Comment, 
Not in My Backyard: The Implications of Sex Offender Residency Ordinances in Texas and 
Beyond, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2009) (“[C]ommunity members have been forced 
out of their neighborhoods and branded as social pariahs because they are sex offenders—a 
reviled and vilified class.”); Meghan Silẽ Towers, Note, Protectionism, Punishment and 
Pariahs: Sex Offenders and Residence Restrictions, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 291, 292 (2007) 
(referring to laws that “make[] pariahs out of sex offenders”); Lindsay A. Wagner, Note, Sex 
Offender Residency Restrictions: How Common Sense Places Children at Risk, 1 DREXEL L. 
REV. 175, 175 (2009) (“Sex offenders, as a group, incite the public’s fear and hatred, and 
politicians seeking to curry electorate favor often support increasingly harsh sanctions 
against these ‘political pariahs of our day.’”). 
2020] RESTORING HUMANITY 1035 
Furthermore, spurred by basketball star Len Bias’s powder-cocaine-
overdose death,208 which many falsely attributed to crack cocaine,209 media 
coverage of the crack epidemic of the late 1980s and 1990s skyrocketed.210 The 
coverage often focused on the claimed link between crack and violent crime,211 
which in turn moved lawmakers to impose severe punishment for crack 
offenses.212 As a result, federal law punished those convicted of selling crack 
 
 208 See Powder in Bias’ Car Said To Be Cocaine, UNITED PRESS INT’L, June 22, 1986, 
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1986/06/22/Powder-in-Bias-car-said-to-be-cocaine/311251 
9796800/?spt=su [https://perma.cc/VYT8-RR43]; Tom Stuckey, Cocaine Blamed for 
Death of Basketball Star Len Bias, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 24, 1986, Fativa, Doc. 
No. asp0000020011119di6o00l1l. 
 209 See, e.g., Jane Mayer & Andy Pasztor, Reagan Starts Drive Against Drug Abuse, 
May Seek More Tests of U.S. Employees, WALL ST. J., July 31, 1986, at 14 (“The White 
House effort comes as pollsters detect increasing public concern over drug abuse, 
precipitated partly by publicity surrounding the drug-related death of basketball star Len Bias 
and by numerous reports on the widespread availability of the intensely lethal form of 
cocaine known as ‘crack.’”); Reginald Stuart, O’Neill Proposes Congress Mount Attack on 
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1986, at A1 (“Congressional aides of both parties said 
momentum for action was coming from the home districts of many lawmakers where 
increased concern has been expressed: illegal drug activity in light of the recent drug-related 
deaths of two athletes, Len Bias of the University of Maryland and Don Rogers of the 
Cleveland Browns, and widespread publicity about addiction to ‘crack,’ a form of cocaine 
that is specially treated for extra potency.”). 
 210 Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 25 
(2010) (noting that “[a] driving force behind [mandatory minimum sentences for drug 
trafficking] was the cocaine overdose of basketball star Len Bias, which prompted a 
remarkable level of media attention and a moral panic about crack cocaine”); Adam M. 
Acosta, Comment, Len Bias’ Death Still Haunts Crack-Cocaine Offenders After Twenty 
Years: Failing to Reduce Disproportionate Crack-Cocaine Sentences Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582, 53 HOW. L.J. 825, 826–27 (2010) (noting that Bias’s death drew widespread media 
attention to crack cocaine). 
 211 See Maxwell Arlie Halpern Kosman, Note, Falling Through the Crack: How Courts 
Have Struggled to Apply the Crack Amendment to “Nominal Career” and “Plea Bargain” 
Defendants, 109 MICH. L. REV. 785, 796 (2011) (noting that the media portrayed crack 
cocaine as “the fuel behind gang violence”). 
 212 Donna M. Hartman & Andrew Golub, The Social Construction of the Crack 
Epidemic in the Print Media, 31 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 423, 424 (1999) (linking the 
“media’s frenzied attention . . . to crack cocaine” with a sixty-one percent increase during a 
three-year period of the number of Americans who saw drug abuse as the nation’s most 
serious problem and Congressional legislation creating long prison sentences for crack-
related crimes); Sarah Hyser  ̧Comment, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: How Federal 
Courts Took the “Fair” Out of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 503, 
508 (2012) (describing how, as a result of national media coverage, “Congress reacted 
quickly to the public outcry by enacting the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 containing severe 
penalties targeting crack cocaine offenders”). 
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(predominantly African American)213 100 times more harshly than the 
(predominantly Caucasian)214 individuals who sold powder cocaine.215 
These media-induced frenzies conceivably explain why the Ohio 
legislature, beginning in 1994, began limiting record sealing to low-level sexual 
offenders.216 Motivated by news reports depicting violent and sexual offenders 
as “the other,”217 the legislature likely viewed them as unworthy of relief.  
IV. EXPANDING CRIMINAL RECORD RELIEF TO HUMAN  
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS 
Underscoring how media narratives drive political determinations of who 
is, and who is not, deserving of a clean slate, the Ohio legislature took a different 
tack for one group of offenders. 
Enacted in 2012,218 and most recently amended in 2019,219 House Bill 262 
permits any person previously convicted of a prostitution-related offense to 
obtain “expungement of the record . . . of any offense, other 
than . . . [aggravated murder], [murder], or [rape],”220 if the court finds “by a 
 
 213 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 15–16 (May 2007), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/ 
congressional-testimony-and-reports/drugtopics/200705_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_ 
Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/68W4-N3HE] (discussing sentencing of African-Americans for 
crack-cocaine offenses); Jeff Lazarus, Making the Fair Sentencing Act Retroactive: Just 
Think of the Savings . . . Clause, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 713, 717 (2013). 
 214 David Cole, Essay, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall 
Kennedy’s “Politics of Distinction”, 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2553 (1995) (“In 1992, 92.6% of 
those convicted for crimes involving crack cocaine were black, while only 4.7% were white; 
at the same time, 45.2% of defendants convicted for powder cocaine crimes were white, and 
only 20.7% were black”); Valeria Vegh Weis, Criminal Selectivity in the United States: A 
History Plagued by Class & Race Bias, 10 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 6 n.15 (2017) (noting 
“[c]rack cocaine sales mostly involve Blacks and powder cocaine mostly involves Whites”). 
 215 DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS 
IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW i, 2 (2006), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/cracksinsystem_20061025.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/CZ7U-SLBW] (describing Anti-Drug Abuse Act’s five-year mandatory 
minimum sentence for dealing five grams of crack compared with the same mandatory 
minimum for selling 500 grams of powder cocaine); Morris S. Zedeck, Problems in Cocaine 
Sentencing: An Update After 25 Years, 95 JUDICATURE 107, 108 (2011).  
 216 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.36 (West 2020); Am. Sub. S.B. 18, 127th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36 (Ohio 2007) (amending OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.36); Am. 
Sub. H.B. 335, 120th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.36 (Ohio 1994) (amending OHIO 
REV. CODE § 2953.36); Stuntz, supra note 178, at 2558.  
 217 See Demleitner, supra note 3, at 1255. 
 218 Am. Sub. H.B. 262, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.38 (Ohio 2012). 
 219 See Am. Sub. H.B. 425, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2953.38 (Ohio 2019).  
 220 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.38(B) (West 2020). The initial version of the statute 
permitted “[a]ny person who is or was convicted of [certain prostitution related offenses] 
may apply to the sentencing court for the expungement of the record of conviction if the 
person’s participation in the offense was a result of the person having been a victim of human 
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preponderance of the evidence that the applicant’s participation in the 
offense . . . was a result of . . . having been a victim of human trafficking,”221 
and that the applicant has satisfied any other required showings.222 
The statute defines “[e]xpunge” as “to destroy, delete, or erase a record as 
appropriate for the record’s physical or electronic form or characteristic so that 
the record is permanently irretrievable.”223 Thus, unlike the record-sealing 
statute,224 the human trafficking expungement statute requires the record’s 
permanent destruction. 
So what moved the legislature to create this mechanism? Simply put, 
stories.225 If the media frenzies described above illustrate how stories can 
“otherize,” then the sympathetic narratives of trafficking victims demonstrate 
the power of stories to humanize. 
As one scholar recently observed, “human trafficking has emerged as ‘one 
of the great human rights causes of our time.’”226 Although the problem has 
existed for a long time,227 and was the subject of federal legislation in 1910,228 
it has regained prominence in the past two decades.229 
 
trafficking.” Ohio H.B. 262 § 2953.38. Some trial courts took the position that this language 
allowed the expungement of any offenses relating to trafficking, not just prostitution-related 
crimes, so the legislature eventually amended the statute to make clear all crimes could be 
expunged if the result of the applicant’s being trafficked, except for aggravated murder, 
murder, and rape. See Ohio H.B. 425 § 2953.38.  
 221 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.38(E)(1)(b) (West 2020); see also OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2953.38(A)(4) (West 2020) (defining a “[v]ictim of human trafficking” as “a person 
who is or was a victim of a violation of section 2905.32 of the Revised Code [trafficking in 
persons], regardless of whether anyone has been convicted of a violation of that section or 
of any other section for victimizing the person”). 
 222 If an applicant seeks to expunge a felony of the first or second degree, then he or she 
must demonstrate that his or her interests in having the records sealed “are not outweighed 
by any legitimate needs of the government to maintain that record of conviction.” OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2953.38(F) (West 2020). 
 223 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.38(A)(1) (West 2020). 
 224 See supra Part III.A. 
 225 See Rachel E. Barkow, Making Connections with The Wire: Telling the Stories 
Behind the Statistics, 2018 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 26 (2018) (“But the reality of human nature 
is that facts and statistics do not move people to action—stories and personal connections 
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The media have raised public awareness of human trafficking as a social 
problem,230 with films like Human Trafficking,231 Taken,232 and The 
Whistleblower233 being “particularly relevant because they are often highlighted 
by advocates and other speakers at human trafficking programs and 
conferences.”234 Portrayals of the problem rely on familiar tropes: “‘the 
innocent victim,’ ‘the evil offender,’ and ‘the good rescuer.’”235 The idealized 
“innocent victim” is young, white, and virginal, making her “completely 
deserving of public sympathy.”236 Indeed, “victimhood is attractive in the sense 
that it secures attention in an attention-taxed world. Victims can get on the 
agenda, the evening news, and the gossip circuit—victims get time. This of 
course is a precondition for any response, including sympathy or help.”237 
The power of the victim frame—viewing trafficking survivors as “victims 
hidden behind a crime”238—has influenced policymakers, as a 2014 U.S. State 
Department report on human trafficking demonstrates: 
Victims of trafficking should not be held liable for their involvement in 
unlawful activities that are a direct consequence of their victimization. 
Trafficked individuals who are forced to commit a crime are commonly 
mistaken for criminals—rather than being identified as victims—and therefore 
treated as such by law enforcement and judicial officials.239 
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The Ohio legislature apparently reached the same conclusion when it 
enacted H.B. 262.240 And when Ohio lawmakers later considered amending this 
statute to broaden what offenses could be expunged, the stories human 
trafficking victims told in support of the amendment were compelling. Rachel, 
a human trafficking survivor, delivered particularly stirring testimony during 
one of the hearings.241 Molested by an older man at age twelve, she met her 
pimp when she was sixteen.242 At first he was “sweet and kind,” but “things 
changed” when he began trafficking her for more than ten years.243 Rachel 
testified: “[h]e would make me dress in skimpy clothes in the cold weather and 
sleep on the streets. Many times, I thought I would die of cold or hunger.”244 
She recalled an especially violent incident when he became angry and “beat 
[her] continually for 7 blocks until [she] was bloody and couldn’t stand.”245 Her 
Johns also beat and raped her.246 
As a result of what she endured, Rachel has lingering physical pain and 
suffers from depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.247 She told the 
legislators that her criminal history imposed an additional burden on her: “My 
criminal record is hard for me because it affects me getting housing . . . and 
applying for jobs. It is also embarrassing for me to have a criminal record.”248 
Rachel closed by urging the legislators to approve the bill so she could “continue 
to rebuild [her] life.”249 Not surprisingly, given Rachel’s and other survivors’ 
testimony,250 the amendment passed.251 
Ohio’s human trafficking expungement statute, and the stories told in 
support of its passage and amendment, reinforce what is possible when 
lawmakers recognize the humanity in offenders and decide to give them a 
meaningful second chance. If expungement, or even more robust record sealing, 
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is to ever become more available, storytelling will be important in expanding 
the opportunity to be forgotten, because stories move people and inspire 
change.252 
V. WHY EXPANDING CRIMINAL RECORD RELIEF MATTERS 
Perhaps Allison, Jane, and Angelo will one day testify before a legislative 
committee about the importance of expanding criminal record relief for people, 
like them, who have been convicted of serious crimes. Their powerful stories 
not only show how their records have limited them but also why they are as 
deserving as human trafficking victims of a meaningful second chance. 
A. Allison Nelson 
Allison puts on a brave face and insists that her criminal conviction has not 
diminished her self-worth: “I am legally disenfranchised, due to my criminal 
record,” she writes, “which limits my ability to perform certain duties [and] 
obtain various certifications and licensures. In addition, my conviction can often 
limit gainful[ ]employment options. Ultimately, I know that my self-worth 
reflects more on accomplishments, than failures or finances.”253  
Despite her feelings, it is clear that Ohio has devalued her by determining 
that she does not deserve the opportunity to teach.254 And by devaluing her, the 
state has hurt the very children it believes she is too dangerous for. Allison has 
no difficulty imagining the good she could have done as an educational 
interventionist, but unless Ohio law changes, Allison will never be able to 
deliver her message—“You can do this too”—to those struggling students that 
so badly need to hear it.255 
In the nearly thirty years since her crime, Allison has had no other arrests,256 
validating the research showing that recidivism by violent offenders is far from 
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the norm.257 More compellingly, Allison has a record of achievement 
demonstrating that the assault she committed—arguably in self-defense—was 
an anomaly that should not define her forever. She earned a bachelor’s, a 
master’s, and a Ph.D.258 In D.C., she taught at the university level.259 But back 
in Ohio, she makes deliveries for Amazon.260 
Allison’s criminal record is no longer relevant in determining who she is 
and whether she is fit to teach.261 She presents an exemplary case for expunging 
or sealing the records of those who have demonstrated their ability to follow 
society’s rules.262 
B. Jane Doe 
Jane defies the common misperception that sex offenders are almost 
guaranteed to reoffend.263 Since committing her crime in 2005, she has not 
committed another sex offense, and aside from her one failure to register, she 
has led a lawful life.264 
Jane may have less to show than Allison in terms of educational and 
professional accomplishments, but she makes up for it with grit and 
determination. She has raised six children on her own, with no help from their 
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fathers and only minimal assistance from family.265 Yet her children are doing 
well; her second oldest hopes to attend college on a basketball scholarship.266 
If she could address Ohio’s lawmakers, she would tell them not to forever 
judge her by the mistake she made: 
[Every person who commits a sex offense] is not the same. . . . I think you 
should know someone’s story and circumstances before judging them. . . . I 
made a mistake, a really bad one, but [I am more than that.] I am a mother. I 
have goals. I am trying to prove myself. . . . Don’t just look at my record and 
decide who I am.267 
As long as she has a criminal record, there will be a “dark cloud” over her 
head.268 Although she struggles to find work and decent housing, she will 
always try to put her “best foot forward. . . . If I wasn’t strong, I would have had 
a nervous breakdown by now.”269 Still, nothing would make her happier than 
having her record expunged or sealed: “It would be a fresh start for our 
family. . . . I [could] be more involved in [my children’s] school 
activities. . . . [M]y children [would] no longer have to pay for my mistakes.”270 
C. Angelo Robinson 
Angelo also describes his conviction as a “dark cloud over [his] head.”271 
Indeed, “[i]t’s hard to reach for the stars when you have something anchoring 
you down. . . .”272 “You’re judged by your criminal record. Everything goes by 
what’s on paper rather than the character of the individual.”273  
In some ways, his hiring by the tool factory, which was aware of his criminal 
record,274 demonstrates precisely the opposite of what he feels. But his biggest 
fear is what his co-workers will think if they discover his record.275 “I would 
rather tell them about my past on my own terms when I’m ready,” Angelo says, 
“after they have already gotten an opportunity to know my character.”276 When 
he hears co-workers casually talking about prison or the criminal legal system, 
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“I just walk away because I think they are talking about me, judging me.”277 
Although he has steady employment at a living wage, he believes that his job 
prospects are limited.278 
If he had the opportunity, Angelo would tell lawmakers that, while he 
accepts responsibility for his crime, society also bears some responsibility for 
his situation.279 He would tell them that he, his mother, and his siblings spent 
his teenage years in Los Angeles, where they were often homeless.280 Because 
there was no social safety net, he would pump gas for hours to earn enough 
money for his family to eat, or scrape together the funds to find a place to sleep 
for the night.281 He joined a gang and was exposed to drug dealing, “because 
that’s what everyone who looked like me did. You just see it everywhere.”282 
He recalls having no positive role models and having no one in his life to stress 
the importance of staying in school.283 “I never had a shot,” he says.284 
Angelo wants everyone who meets or reads about him to know that he is 
not the same person he was the night he accidentally killed Veronica.285 But he 
quickly adds, “I never was that person. It was a role I had to play to survive my 
environment.”286 He only hopes that Ohio will eventually recognize that people 
who commit serious crimes and have rehabilitated themselves deserve to have 
their records sealed so that they can live without being defined by the past.287  
VI. EPILOGUE 
On September 2, 2020, Jane Doe, represented by the author, appeared 
before the same judge who had classified her as a sexual predator in 2006.288 
Two weeks before the hearing, Jane filed a motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea,289 arguing that that withdrawal of her plea was necessary to correct 
manifest injustice,290 the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea after sentencing 
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in Ohio.291 Stating that she “never imagined how her life would be destroyed by 
pleading guilty 14 years ago to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor,”292 Jane 
contended that it would be “manifestly just . . . to let [her] withdraw her guilty 
plea to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and plead guilty instead to 
misdemeanor assault in order to end the harsh and unanticipated consequences 
her plea and classification have visited upon her and her children.”293 
Fortunately for Jane, the county prosecutor’s office supported the relief she 
sought,294 and on September 2, 2020, the court granted the motion.295 After 
pleading guilty to misdemeanor assault, the court sentenced Jane to time served 
and terminated her sex offender registration requirements.296 Today, Jane is no 
longer a convicted sexual offender.297  
Shortly after she left court on September 2, Jane completed an application 
for public housing.298 “I’m crying again,” she wrote the author, “but it’s happy 
tears.”299 Jane is now free to live her best life, unburdened by the stigma of her 
original conviction and resulting predator classification. To a large extent, her 
humanity has been restored. 
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